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Abstract— In this paper a three fuzzy vault schemes which integrated with discrete logarithmic encryption scheme are 
proposed. In the first scheme, the message 𝒎 is encoded with discrete logarithmic encryption scheme using randomly 
generated identity key 𝛋  for every message and then divided into non-overlapping segments. In the second scheme, the 
message is divided into non-overlapping segments and each segment is encoded with discrete logarithmic encryption scheme 
using the randomly generated identity key κ. In the third scheme, the message is divided into non-overlapping segments where 
even segments are encoded with identity key 𝛋 
𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏
 and odd segments are encoded with identity key 𝛋 
𝒐𝒅𝒅
. Identity keys 
𝛋 
𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏
 and 𝛋 
𝒐𝒅𝒅
 are randomly generated for every message. Finally, the encoded segments are declared as coefficients of a 
polynomial of specific degree. In all proposed schemes, elements of locking set 𝐀 are used as 𝑿-coordinate values to compute 
evaluations of the polynomial by projecting elements of 𝐀 onto points lying on the polynomial. A large number of random 
chaff points that do not lie on the polynomial are added to create noise to hide the encoded segments. Security analysis has 
shown the proposed scheme enjoys provable security over classical fuzzy vaults. 
 
Index Terms— fuzzy vault scheme, polynomial reconstruction, 
discrete logarithmic encryption  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The traditional fuzzy vault scheme is an algorithm operating 
on a set of elements for locking a message 𝑚 encoded in the 
coefficients of a polynomial equation. Its security is based on 
the difficulty of reconstructing the polynomial equation. 
Fuzziness is achieved by adding noise points which are related 
but not identical points called chaff points to the vault which 
cause confusion to the intruder. The scheme can tolerate some 
differences between the sets used to lock and unlock the vault 
but the intruder should face computationally infeasible 
problems in order to achieve this goal [1-3]. In biometric 
fuzzy vaults it was shown in [4] that recovering biometric data 
from templates is possible which motivates us to search for 
further protection of fuzzy vaults. It is common, in traditional 
cryptography, if message keys are not identical, the decryption 
process will output useless random data [5]. So, in order to 
protect a fuzzy vault from its inherent vulnerabilities 
traditional cryptographic techniques must be put into action. 
The existing attacks on fuzzy vaults are categorized into: chaff 
point attacks where the attack on fuzzy vault schemes depends 
on the non-randomness observation of chaff points which was 
observed by Scheirer et al [6]. Chaff points with smaller free 
area has more neighboring points in the set of fuzzy 
vault 𝐹𝑉 than chaff points with larger free area is a 
shortcoming which makes fuzzy vaults subject to attacks 
based on chaff points identification [6]. Perturbation attacks 
are another type of attacks on fuzzy vaults. It is commonly 
known that perturbation of any bit in a classical cryptosystem 
key such as AES or RSA will hinder decryption completely. 
However, perturbation is tolerated in fuzzy vaults which make 
fuzzy vaults vulnerable against perturbation attacks. 
Fingerprints fuzzy vaults are vulnerable to correlation attacks 
which correlate data from two fingerprint impressions of two 
fuzzy vaults. An intruder uses exhaustive matching to find the 
best alignment between the two vaults to recover the original 
elements of the encoding set or the secret polynomial [6].  
Correlation is at maximum when the overlap between 
biometric data of corresponding enrollments is at maximum. 
Most fingerprints fuzzy vaults that are minutiae-based are 
vulnerable to brute force attack which breaks the 
irreversibility requirement. Brute force indicates the security 
limitation of fuzzy vaults [7]. Even fingerprints fuzzy vaults 
hardened with passwords are vulnerable to brute force attacks 
[8-9] such as dictionary attacks where the words in a 
dictionary are input one after the other. Also, a mix of capital 
letters, small letters and numbers are used [9]. Hybrid attacks 
use a dictionary storing hundreds of words with substitutions 
or appending a character to the beginning or the end of a word 
[5]. In superstitious key-inversion attack, the attacker obtains a 
cryptographic secret key of an authorized user by exploiting 
weak points in the system such as during submitting or 
transmitting the key [10]. Brute force attack can be improved 
using statistical attack which exploits the statistical 
distribution of the feature data. An intruder ranks the vault 
points using the probability occurrence of corresponding 
feature data, and samples the points for polynomial 
interpolation only from the top ranked 𝑤 points [7]. Using this 
attack an intruder can insert new points in the available space 
without violating the minimum distance requirement between 
points in the vault [11]. Blended substitution attack is the 
major attack among other types of attacks where the contents 
of the information in the fuzzy vault can be corrupted with 
random data whether the intruder has information about the 
contents or not [12]. For example, in biometric fuzzy vaults 
during the acquisition of a user’s biometric data an attacker 
can inject a set of biometric data other than the biometric set 
of the authenticated user. False-accept attack is a serious 
problem [13-16] in fingerprints fuzzy vaults where the 
attacker collects a large database contains a pre-aligned 
minutiae templates that can successively use them to simulate 
imposter verification. Record multiplicity attacks depend on 
cross-matching i.e. linking multiple vault records created 
using the same biometric data. For example, linking two fuzzy 
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vaults created for the same individual using the same genuine 
points but with different chaff points [17]. Traditional fuzzy 
vaults contain two drawbacks in the fuzzy commitment 
scheme which are intolerance of substantial reordering and 
security over non-uniform distribution. 
II. PREVIOUS WORK 
Pioneering work in fuzzy vault schemes was done by Juels 
and Sudan [1] which was inspired by the previous work of 
Juels and Wattenberg [3] where error-correcting codes were 
introduced. Since fingerprints are durable, unchangeable and 
uniquely identify their owners, this motivated Clancy et al. 
[18] to use the fuzzy vault scheme to protect the minutiae of 
fingerprints. Also, U. Uludag, et al. [19] had constructed a 
fuzzy vault that uses the 𝑥 and 𝑦 coordinates of fingerprint 
minutiae points to secure fingerprint templates. However, 
traditional fuzzy vaults especially fingerprints fuzzy vaults are 
vulnerable to several attacks, this motivated K. Nandakumar 
al. [20] to propose a scheme for hardening a fingerprint fuzzy 
vault using password but the scheme is also vulnerable against 
several attacks which motivated Suming Hong et al. [10] to 
propose a hashed passwords fingerprint fuzzy vault but the 
problem still exists because passwords are created using: A-Z, 
a-z, 0-9, and symbols: $, #, +, @, =, /, & hashes of passwords 
are generated and compared to the given hash. To protect 
fuzzy vaults against correlation attacks Johannes Merkle et al. 
[21] proposed a fingerprints fuzzy vault that is correlation 
resistant and Manvjeet Kaur et al. [22] proposed a fuzzy vault 
scheme that is combined with Hadamard transformation 
technique, to prevent correlation attack to an appreciable level. 
Also, Sungju Lee et al. [23] added chaff points in a more 
structured way namely 3D lattice to make it computationally 
hard for an attacker to distinguish between the real points and 
chaff points of two fuzzy vaults. Blended substitution attack is 
difficult to prevent, however Sarala S. M. et al. in [12] have 
launched a blended substitution attack by corrupting the fuzzy 
vault with random data. By storing the real points of the vault 
in a server that is connected with the vault’s database the 
fuzzy vault was able to self-recover after the attack. All the 
above approaches to protect fuzzy vaults against a variety of 
attacks are based solely on the concept of the difficulty of 
polynomial reconstruction problem which makes fuzzy vaults 
vulnerable to all previous attacks. In order for a fuzzy vault to 
be robust against various attacks conventional cryptographic 
techniques must take part in the construction of the fuzzy 
vault. The first attempt to combine cryptographic techniques 
with the fuzzy vault scheme was proposed by Cun-Zhang Cao 
et al. [24] where the authors protect a secret key κ by dividing 
it into sub-keys which are encoded into Reed-Solomon 
codewords before being declared as coefficients of a specific 
polynomial. T.W. Chim et al. in [25] create a shared key 
between two parties using the Deffie-Hellman key exchange 
scheme [26] then they encode this created key into the 
coefficients of a polynomial of specific degree. The first 
scheme does not employ the difficulty of solving the discrete 
logarithmic problem which is believed to be hard with the 
fuzzy vault scheme which depends on the difficulty of 
reconstructing a polynomial of specific degree to protect the 
created shared key. The second scheme uses the Deffie-
Hellman scheme to exchange keys but it cannot be used to 
protect other secret messages. The proposed discrete 
logarithmic fuzzy vault can protect any secret message 𝑚, 
where 𝑚 is firstly encoded with discrete logarithmic 
encryption scheme then it is hidden in the coefficients of a 
polynomial of a specific degree. The 
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑓𝑢𝑧𝑧𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 draws its security from 
the integration between the difficulties of two problems 
namely the polynomial reconstruction problem which is 
believed to be hard in general if  𝑟 ≪  �𝑛. (𝑘 − 1), where 𝑟 is 
the number of real elements, (𝑘 − 1) is the polynomial degree 
and 𝑛 is the vault size [27-31] and solving the discrete 
logarithm problem. Xavier Boyen in [32] constructed two 
security models to address the shortcoming of reusing fuzzy 
messages which makes fuzzy vaults vulnerable to perturbation 
attack.  
The motivation of this work is to enhance the security of 
the classical fuzzy vault scheme which hides a secret message 
𝑚 into a polynomial of specific degree. The security of the 
current fuzzy vault depends exclusively on the chaff points 
that are added to create noise which result in a number of 
spurious polynomials and does not involve the length of the 
message 𝑚 it protects which makes the vault weaker than the 
message it protects. Therefore, using only locking elements as 
a method to secure fuzzy vaults are not sufficient without 
integrating some other techniques into the process. Blending 
two different security schemes which are based on different 
cryptographic bases will provide the blended security scheme 
with the advantages of each security scheme and substitute for 
the weakness of any scheme with the strength of the other 
scheme. This is expected to improve the security threshold of 
protecting a secret message 𝑚. Hence, the security of the 
blended discrete logarithmic fuzzy vault scheme is based on 
both a polynomial reconstruction problem and a discrete 
logarithm problem.  
  In the proposed blended fuzzy vault scheme, which we 
call discrete logarithmic fuzzy vaults where a randomly 
generated identity key κ for every message is involved in the 
encryption process. In the first scheme the secret message 𝑚 is 
encoded with the identity key κ using discrete logarithmic 
encryption scheme. The encoded message is divided into non-
overlapped segments and each segment is declared as the 
coefficient of a polynomial of specific degree. In the second 
scheme the message 𝑚 is first divided into 𝑛  non-overlapped 
segments where each segment is encoded using discrete 
logarithmic encryption scheme with an identity key κ . Each 
encoded segment is then declared as the coefficient of a 
polynomial of specific degree 𝑘. In the third scheme odd 
segments in the 𝑛 non-overlapped segment are encoded using 
a randomly generated odd identity key κ𝒐𝒅𝒅 while even 
segments are encoded using a randomly generated even 
identity key κ𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏. The identity keys κ𝒐𝒅𝒅 and κ𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏 are 
randomly generated for every message. This is in addition to a 
large number of generated chaff points which create noise to 
hide the encrypted message 𝑚 in the vault. The greater the 
number of such points, the more noise there is to conceal the 
real polynomial 𝑃(𝑥) from an attacker. Blending a classical 
fuzzy vault which is based on the noise created by a large 
number of chaff points to hide a secret message 𝑚 and 
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discrete logarithmic encryption scheme which is based on a 
cyclic group 𝐻 of a large prime 𝑝 and identity keys κ, κ𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏 
and κ𝒐𝒅𝒅 an attacker can get message 𝑚 if he could solve the 
discrete logarithm problem on 𝐻 then reconstructs the 
polynomial 𝑃(𝑥). Hence, the proposed fuzzy vault scheme 
blends two cryptographic schemes, the first scheme is the 
discrete logarithmic encryption scheme that is directly 
embedded into the second cryptographic scheme which is the 
fuzzy vault scheme. For an attacker to access the hidden 
message 𝑚 is equivalent to successfully reconstruct the 
polynomial 𝑃(𝑥) and to solve the discrete logarithm problem 
on 𝐻. The integrated discrete logarithmic fuzzy vault scheme 
offers an alternative that is provably secure in an information 
theoretic sense to the well-known fuzzy vault scheme.  
This paper is organized as follows: section III is dedicated 
for traditional fuzzy vault scheme, section IV is dedicated for 
the proposed discrete logarithmic fuzzy vault schemes, section 
IV is dedicated for non-malleability, section V discusses 
security analysis and final section VI is dedicated for 
conclusion. 
III. THE TRADITIONAL FUZZY VAULT SCHEME 
The message 𝑚 to be kept in the vault will be represented 
in a binary format such that 𝑚 ∈ {0,1}∗of 𝑙 bits length. The 
user that wants to hide the message 𝑚 in the vault should get 
his/her finger scanned and a locking set 𝐿 that contains x and y 
coordinates of 𝑡 minutiae points is selected from this finger 
template. The 𝑥 and 𝑦 coordinates of each minutia (8-bits) are 
concatenated as 𝑋𝑖 =  [𝑥𝑖𝑦𝑖] to obtain a 16-bits locking set 𝐿. 
This fingerprint template must have negligible nonlinear 
distortions and its minutiae are aligned to compensate for the 
translation and rotation between template and query minutiae 
data [5]. A finite field 𝐹𝑞 is attached to the vault such that: 
 κ′ + 1 =  𝑙
⌈log2(𝑞)⌉                               (1) 
is the number of elements in 𝐹𝑞 which is necessary to encode 
𝑚. It is assumed that 0 < max𝑋∈𝐿 𝑋 < 𝑞 and maps 𝑋 → 𝐹𝑞 .  
Select 𝑓(𝑋) ∈ 𝐹𝑞[𝑋] to be a polynomial of degree κ ≥ κ′ with 
coefficients to encode  𝑚.  
The genuine set: 
𝐺 = {(𝑋𝑖 ,𝑌𝑖 ):𝑋𝑖 ∈ 𝐿,𝑌𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑋𝑖)}                       (2) 
encodes the message 𝑚. In order to be hard for an attacker to 
recover message 𝑚, the genuine points in the genuine set are 
mixed with chaff points where: 
𝐶 = {�𝑥𝑐𝑗 ,𝑦𝑐𝑗� ∶ 𝑋𝑖 ≠ 𝑋𝑐𝑗 ,𝑌𝑖 ≠ 𝑌𝑐𝑗 , 𝑖 = 1,2, … … . 𝑡,   
𝑗 = 1,2, … . . 𝑟 − 𝑡}                              (3) 
is the set of chaff points where 𝑟 is the total number of points 
in the locking set 𝐿. Therefore, the locking set 𝐿 = 𝐺 ∪ 𝐶. 
Finally, 𝐿 is passed through a list scrambler which randomizes 
the list. In order to recover the message 𝑚 a locking set 𝑈 
containing those 𝑋𝑖 values of the vault points [5]. 
IV. PROPOSED SCHEMES 
In this section, we present our implementations of the three 
discrete logarithmic fuzzy vault schemes to overcome the 
vulnerabilities associated with traditional fuzzy vaults 
especially biometric fuzzy vaults. Using different polynomials 
and chaff points for different vaults will not be effective in 
securing a message 𝑚 especially if the same lock set 𝐿 is 
reused.  
A. Pre- Lock Stage 
This stage is implemented for the lock phase of all the three 
schemes of discrete logarithmic fuzzy vault.  
1) Generate a 128-bit signature 𝑆 using 𝑀𝐷5 to be appended 
to message 𝑚 such that: 
             𝑆  =  𝑀𝐷5(𝑚)                               (4) 
                     𝑚′ = [𝑚, 𝑆]                              (5) 
2) Let 𝐴 = {𝑎𝑖}𝑖=1𝑡  is a locking set containing 𝑡 elements 
where 𝑎𝑖𝜖 𝐹𝑞 and 𝐹𝑞 is a finite field.  
3) Use 𝛼κ where 𝛼 is a primitive root of a very large prime 𝑝 
which is usually at least 1024-bit to make the fuzzy vault safe 
and κ is the identity key randomly generated for every 
message from {1 … . . , 𝑞 − 1}. For this reason κ is called an 
ephemeral key. 
 
B. Pre- UNLock Stage 
This stage is implemented for the unlock phase of all the 
three schemes of discrete logarithmic fuzzy vault where 
𝐵 = {𝑏𝑖}𝑖=1𝑡  is an unlocking set where 𝑏𝑖ϵ 𝐹𝑞. 
 
C. Algorithm I 
1) Vault Locking 
The concept lies in dividing the message 𝑚′ into 𝑛 non-
overlapping 256-bit segments (𝑚′1,𝑚′2, … … . . ,𝑚′𝑛) then 
each segment 𝑚′𝑖 is encoded with discrete logarithmic 
encryption scheme using 𝛼κ. Each encoded segment is then 
declared as a specific coefficient of a polynomial 𝑃. 
• Let 𝛽𝑖 =  𝑚′𝑖𝛼κ ∀ i = 1,2, … … , n                (6) 
Where 𝑚′𝑖: is the 𝑖𝑡ℎ part of the protected message 𝑚′. 
 κ: is the identity key randomly generated for every message  𝑚′ from {1 … . . , q − 1}. 
• Call Post- Lock  
 
2) Vault Unlocking 
To retrieve message 𝑚 the unlocking set 𝐵 is used to 
recover 𝛽𝑖𝑠. If 𝐵 is close enough to 𝐴, then 𝐵 will identify 
most real points in 𝑉and 𝛽𝑖𝑠 are retrieved. 
• If (|𝑎𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖 |≤ 𝛿)∀𝑖 = 1,2, … . . 𝑡 then the corresponding vault 
point in 𝑉 is added to the list of points to be used. 
• Use Lagrange interpolation to reconstruct polynomial 𝑃 
using 𝑋𝑣 and retrieve 𝛽𝑖
∗∀ = 1,2,3, . . , n 
• If |𝛽𝑖 -𝛽𝑖∗ |≤ 𝛿 then 𝛽𝑖∗ = 𝛽𝑖                      (7) 
• Multiply 𝛽𝑖 by 𝛼−κas follows: 
 𝛽𝑖𝛼−κ = 𝑚′𝑖𝛼κ𝛼−κ = 𝑚′𝑖𝛼0= 𝑚′𝑖 ∀ 𝑖 = 1,2, … . ,𝑛         (8) 
• Concatenate 𝑚′ ←[𝑚′|𝑚′𝑖] ∀ 𝑖 = 1,2, … . ,𝑛,                (9) 
where | means concatenation. 
• Call Post-UNLock  
 
Algorithm II 
1) Vault Locking  
  The concept lies in encoding the message 𝑚 with discrete 
logarithmic encryption scheme. The encoded message is then 
divided into 𝑛 non-overlapping 256-bit segments and each 
segment is declared as a specific coefficient.  
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• Let 𝛽 =  𝑚′𝛼κ                             (10) 
Where κ: the identity key is randomly generated for every 
message  𝑚′ from {1 … . . , q − 1}. 
Divide 𝛽 into (𝛽1,𝛽2 , … … . . ,𝛽𝑛). 
• Call Post-Lock  
 
2) Vault Unlocking 
To retrieve message 𝑚 the unlocking set 𝐵 is used to 
recover the 𝛽𝑖𝑠. If 𝐵 is close enough to 𝐴, then 𝐵 will 
identify most real points in 𝑉and 𝛽𝑖𝑠  are retrieved.  
• If (|𝑎𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖 |≤ 𝛿)∀𝑖 = 1,2, . . 𝑡 then the corresponding vault 
point in 𝑉 is added to the list of points to be used. 
• Use Lagrange interpolation to reconstruct polynomial 𝑃 
using 𝑋𝑣 and retrieve 𝛽𝑖
∗∀ = 1,2,3, … . . , n 
• If |𝛽𝑖 -𝛽𝑖∗ |≤ 𝛿 then 𝛽𝑖∗ = 𝛽𝑖                             (11) 
• Concatenate 𝛽 ←[𝛽|𝛽𝑖] ∀ 𝑖 = 1,2, … . ,𝑛,             (12) 
    where | means concatenation. 
• Multiply 𝛽 by 𝛼−κ as follows: 
    𝛽𝛼−κ = 𝑚′𝛼κ𝛼−κ = 𝑚′𝛼0= 𝑚′ ∀ 𝑖 = 1,2, … . ,𝑛           (13) 
• Call Post- UNLock. 
 
D. Algorithm III 
1) Vault Locking  
   The concept lies in dividing the secret message 𝑚 into 𝑛 
non-overlapping 256-bit segments then encode the even 
segments with discrete logarithmic encryption scheme using 
𝛼κ𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛  and encode the odd segments using 𝛼κ𝑜𝑑𝑑 where κ𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛 
and κ𝑜𝑑𝑑 are even and odd identity keys randomly generated 
for every message from {1 … , q − 1} to encode the even 
segments and odd segments of the secret message 𝑚 
respectively. Each segment is then declared as a coefficient 
polynomial 𝑃.  
• Let 𝛽𝑖 =  𝑚𝑖′𝛼κ𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛∀ 𝑖 = 𝑛 %2 = 0,𝑖 = 1,2 … … ,𝑛       (14) 
Where κ𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛: the identity key randomly generated for even 
segments of every message  𝑚′ from {1 … . . , 𝑞 − 1}. 
• Let 𝛽𝑖 =  𝑚𝑖′𝛼κ𝑜𝑑𝑑  ∀ 𝑖 = 𝑛 %2 ≠ 0, 𝑖 = 1,2 … … ,𝑛      (15) 
Where κ𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛: the identity key randomly generated for odd 
segments of every message  𝑚′ from {1 … . . , 𝑞 − 1}. 
• Call Post-Lock 
 
2) Vault Unlocking 
To retrieve message 𝑚 the unlocking set 𝐵 is used to 
recover 𝛽𝑖𝑠. If 𝐵 is close enough to 𝐴, then 𝐵 will identify 
most real points in 𝑉and 𝛽𝑖𝑠 are retrieved. 
• Consider the unlocking set 𝐵 = {𝑏𝑖}𝑖=1𝑡 where𝑏𝑖ϵ 𝐹𝑞. 
• If (|𝑎𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖 |≤ 𝛿)∀𝑖 = 1,2, . . 𝑡 then the corresponding vault 
point in 𝑉 is added to the list of points to be used. 
• Use Lagrange interpolation to reconstruct polynomial 𝑃 
using 𝑋𝑣 and retrieve 𝛽𝑖
∗∀ = 1,2,3, . . , n 
• If |𝛽𝑖 -𝛽𝑖∗ |≤ 𝛿 then 𝛽𝑖∗ = 𝛽𝑖                    (16) 
• Multiply 𝛽𝑖 by 𝛼−κ𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛as follows: 
  𝛽𝑖𝛼−κ𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛 = 𝑚𝑖𝛼κ𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝛼−κ𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛 = 𝑚𝑖𝛼0= 𝑚𝑖 ∀ 𝑖 = 𝑛%2 = 0,  
  𝑖 = 1,2 … … ,𝑛          (17) 
• Multiply 𝛽𝑖 by 𝛼−κ𝑜𝑑𝑑as follows: 
𝛽𝑖𝛼
−κ𝑜𝑑𝑑 = 𝑚𝑖𝛼κ𝑜𝑑𝑑𝛼−κ𝑜𝑑𝑑  = 𝑚𝑖𝛼0= 𝑚𝑖 ∀ 𝑖 = 𝑛%2 ≠ 0, 
𝑖 = 1,2 … … ,𝑛 
• Concatenate 𝑚′ ←[𝑚′|𝑚′𝑖] ∀ 𝑖 = 1,2, … . ,𝑛,              (18) 
where | means concatenation. 
• Call Post-UNLock. 
E. Post- Lock Stage  
This stage is applied to all the three schemes of discrete 
logarithmic fuzzy Vault.   
1) Lock 𝛽𝑖𝑠 in polynomial 𝑃(𝑋) with 𝑛 − 1 degree such that:  
𝑃(𝑋) =  𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑛 + 𝛽𝑛−1𝑋𝑛−1 + ⋯+ 𝛽1𝑋 + 𝛽0        (19) 
2) (𝑥𝑖 ,𝑦𝑖) ← ( 𝑎𝑖, 𝑃(𝑎𝑖)) ∀𝑖 = 1,2, … … , 𝑡              (20) 
3) 𝑉 ← 𝑉 ∪ (𝑥𝑖 ,𝑦𝑖) where 𝑉 is the set containing real points 
and chaff points. The set 𝐴 specifies the 𝑥-coordinates of 
real points in 𝑉, i.e. those points lying on polynomial 𝑃(𝑋). 
4) 25BGenerate chaff point𝑠 (𝑢𝑖 ,𝑣𝑖) where 𝑢𝑖 ∈ 𝐹 − 𝐴 and        
𝑣𝑖 ≠ 𝑃(𝑢𝑖) 𝑖. 𝑒. not lying on polynomial 𝑃. 
5) 𝑉 ← 𝑉 ∪  (𝑢𝑖 ,𝑣𝑖) ∀𝑖 = 1,2, … 𝑟 − 𝑡.                     (21) 
6) 27BThe set 𝑉 is the union of all real points (𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑖) and all 
chaff points (𝑢𝑖 , 𝑣𝑖) ∀𝑖 = 1,2, … … , 𝑟 where 𝑟 is the total 
number of real and chaff points. 
7) 28BScramble the fuzzy vault set 𝑉. 
 
F. 12BPost- UNLock Stage 
This stage is applied to all three schemes of discrete 
logarithmic fuzzy Vault.  
1) Extract the message signature 𝑆 which are the last 128-bits 
of 𝑚′ and retrieve the message 𝑚∗. 
2) 𝑆∗ =  𝑀𝐷5(𝑚∗)                          (22) 
3) If (𝑆∗ = 𝑆) then 𝑚∗ = 𝑚                          (23) 
 
IV. 4BNON-MALLEABILITY 
To achieve non-malleability it is necessary for the discrete 
logarithmic fuzzy vault user to have a unique 𝐼𝐷.  
 
Encoding: 
1) 29BSelect random secret key κ of 128-bits length. 
2) 30BChoose  64 − 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠 ID. 
3) 31BTo identify that the 𝐼𝐷 of the user is the actual 𝐼𝐷 generate 16 − 𝑏𝑖𝑡s CRC data from the user’s 𝐼𝐷. 
4) 32BAppend the 16 − 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠 data to the 64 − 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝐼𝐷 to 
construct 𝐼𝐷𝐶. 
5) 33BThe 𝐼𝐷𝐶 is represented as a polynomial of 4 coefficients 
(64/16) in 𝐺𝐹(216) with degree d=3 is used to find the 
coefficients of the polynomial 𝑃.  That is: 
  𝑃(𝑋) =  𝑐3𝑋3 + 𝑐2𝑋2 + 𝑐1𝑋 + 𝑐0                  (24) 
6) 34BAppend the 90-bits ID to the 128-bits secret key κ to 
construct κ𝐼𝐷 of 208-bits of data. 
7) 35BThe κ𝐼𝐷 represented as a polynomial of 13 coefficients 
(192/16) in 𝐺𝐹(216) with degree d=12 is used to find the 
coefficients of the polynomial 𝑃.  That is: 
  𝑃(𝑋) =  𝑐12𝑋12 + 𝑐11𝑋11 + ⋯+ 𝑐1𝑋 + 𝑐0          (25) 
8) 36BDivide κ𝐼𝐷 into non-overlapping 256-bits segments and 
each segment is declared as a specific coefficient, i.e. 
𝑐𝑖, 𝑖 = 0,1,2, … … ,12. This mapping from κ𝐼𝐷 to 𝑐𝑖 should 
be known during decoding as decoded coefficients 𝑐∗𝑖 are 
mapped back to decoded secret κ𝐼𝐷∗ 
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Decoding: 
1) Construct the polynomial: 
𝑃∗(𝑋) =  𝑐∗12𝑋12 + 𝑐∗11𝑋11 + ⋯+ 𝑐∗1𝑋 + 𝑐∗0        (26) 
2) Map the coefficients c∗i to κID∗. 
3) The κID∗ is segmented into 2 parts the first 128-bits denote 
κ∗while the remaining 90-bits are the user 𝐼𝐷 including the  16 − 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝐶𝑅𝐶 data. 
4) The first 64 − 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠 of the IDC is the reconstructed user ID∗ 
while the remaining 16 − 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠 is the 𝐶𝑅𝐶 data. 
5) To check if this the reconstructed ID∗ is the actual 𝐼𝐷 we 
divide the polynomial corresponding to 𝐼𝐷𝐶 with 𝐶𝑅𝐶 
primitive polynomial: 
𝑃𝐶𝑅𝐶(𝑋) =  𝑋16 + 𝑋15 + 𝑋2 + 1               (27) 
if the remainder is zero with very high probability then we 
are certain that this is the actual 𝐼𝐷 of the user and the 
decoded secret key κ is the user’s secret , otherwise it is 
rejected and the reconstructed secret κ∗ is rejected. 
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
The security of our proposed discrete logarithmic fuzzy 
vault scheme depends on the difficulty to reconstruct a 
polynomial 𝑃 of specific degree 𝑑 which hides in its 
coefficients a secret message 𝑚 after encrypting that message 
using discrete logarithm encryption scheme. A number of 
chaff points 𝑟 − 𝑡 add noise to increase the difficulty of 
reconstructing the polynomial 𝑃. A message signature 𝑆 is 
generated using 𝑀𝐷5 and appended to the end of the message 
to protect its integrity. One scheme of discrete logarithmic 
fuzzy vault is dividing the secret message 𝑚 into 𝑛 segments 
where each segment 𝑚𝑖 is encrypted using a discrete 
logarithm encryption scheme then each segment is declared a 
coefficient in polynomial 𝑃. An alternative scheme is to 
encrypt the message 𝑚 using discrete logarithm encryption 
scheme and then divide the encrypted message into 𝑛 
segments then each segment is declared as a coefficient of 
polynomial 𝑃. Message segmentation increases the difficulty 
for an intruder to retrieve the full message 𝑚  by decoding and 
integrating its segments. Dividing the secret message 𝑚 into 𝑛 
segments makes each segment 𝑚𝑖  a discrete logarithm 
problem which is very hard to be solved for the attacker to 
reconstruct the full message 𝑚. The greater the number of 
message segments the more difficulty for an intruder to 
retrieve the full message. In addition to this, the security of the 
proposed fuzzy vault depends on the number of chaff points. 
The number of chaff points depends on the number of real 
elements which are directly related to them. The more real 
elements the more chaff points are added to the fuzzy vault 
and there will be a set of discrete logarithms that look like 𝛽𝑖 
but are not real.  In the absence of additional information the 
intruder cannot differentiate between the correct 𝛽𝑖s and the 
spurious ones. The real 𝛽𝑖s are hidden with security 
proportional to the number of spurious discrete logarithms. Let 
the set 𝐹𝑉 contains 𝑟 points such that 𝑟 are the genuine points 
and 𝑟 − 𝑡 are the chaff points, the probability for an attacker to 
obtain the correct real points used to lock the genuine 
polynomial is: 
                  
�
𝑟
𝑠
�
�
𝑟−𝑡
𝑠
�
=  𝑟
𝑟−𝑡
                (28) 
which becomes smaller as 𝑟 − 𝑡 becomes bigger such that 
𝑟 <  𝑟 − 𝑡 <  𝑠, where 𝑠 is the number of elements in set 𝐹𝑉. 
The probability for an attacker to obtain the genuine 
polynomial is: 
          ∏ 𝑟
𝑟−𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1                     (29) 
which can be written as: 
                  � 𝑟
𝑟−𝑡
�
𝑛
                                                                 (30)                
where 𝑛 is the degree of the genuine polynomial. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Based on the fuzzy vault scheme and discrete logarithm 
encryption scheme an integrated discrete logarithm fuzzy vault 
scheme is proposed. The security of the proposed fuzzy vault 
is based on both the security of classical fuzzy vault and 
discrete logarithm security schemes. The applications of the 
proposed fuzzy vault are the same for the classical fuzzy vault 
scheme but with higher security level. 
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